The Information Role of Earnings Conference Calls: How Earnings Calls Alter Demand for Quarterly Reports

Abstract: This paper investigates how qualitative and quantitative information in earnings calls change the information acquisition for mandated filings via EDGAR. Using a large sample of earnings conference call from 2007 to 2017, I find that both qualitative and quantitative information in earnings call impede the information acquisition activities through EDGAR. To establish a causal relation, I use the weather condition on earnings call date as the instrument for information released during earnings calls. After implementing 2SLS regression, I confirm that more information within earnings calls leads to a reduction in information acquisition through EDGAR. I also examine this information acquisition activity on market reaction and find high information acquisition via EDGAR decrease short-term market reaction and delay in-time analyst forecast revisions. I confirm the increase in information acquisition via EDGAR is due to the processing costs difference between mandated filings and earnings calls by separating my original sample according to the level of processing difficulties of firm’s earnings calls.

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